Finska artilleriets berömda teknik

[Ragnar Svedje]

Jag undrar lite grand om Finlands artilleri, har förstått att de under andra världskriget låg långt framme inom artilleri och att de kunde konsten att "ställa in" artilleriet utan att skjuta in sig. Således kunde de överfalla en rysk kolonn på våg till fronten med verkningsfull eld innan de han köra fordonen av vägen och ta skydd (vilket annars skulle blviit fallet om de börjat med att skjuta in sig på målet).

Har läst standardverket Finland i Krig och där står ovan nämnda redogjort utan att några detaljer lämnas ut. SKulle vara jätteintressant om någon här kunde berätta hur det gick till rent praktiskt. Vidare som kuriosa om det fanns andra länder som hade liknande (eller mer avancerat) artilleri.

[Ja77]

Det är mycket lättare att ställa in artelleriet i en statiskt front som finsk/ryska, där frontlinien inte flyttades sig alldeles för många km i veckan.

Du befinner dig på egen mark, du har bra kartunderlag, på ren svenska du vet exakt var du är och du vet exakt var du vill skjuta. På några minuter/timmar? kan du räkna ut skjutelementen till de olika punkterna du vill beskjuta, tex vägen där ryssarna förväntas komma. Mycket är bara matematik.

Sedan när ryssarna kommer så medelar de finska soldaterna battriet ryssar vid punkt 5, battiet kollar bara i de redan uträknade tabelerna hur kanonerna ska riktas för att träffa punkt 5....

Alla andra länder hadde liknande system, men då var fronten mer rörlig, artelleriet vist tex bara ungefär var de var och uppgifterna var mer flytande tex fienden 2 km söder om byn X, då var man tvungen att ha en eldledare som kunde korigera elden eller aceptera stor osäkerhet om man träffade eller inte.

[MD650]

Det var den finska artillerigeneralen Nenonen som tog fram det finska systemet avseende skjutning. Det är det vi bygger vårt svenska artillerisystem i Sverige på.

Det är inte så lätt att skjuta rätt med artilleri trots att man befinner sig på egen mark. Om jag har förstått rätt så bygger Nenonens metoder på att man tar hänsyn till såväl inner- som ytterballistik (d.v.s. t.ex. kruttemperatur, krutets utformning, eldrörslängd samt yttertemperatur, lufttryck m.m.)

[Belisarius]

Amerikanarna var väl överlägset bäst på att pejla in målområdet snabbt med sitt artilleri? OK, visst hade de massor och gott om duktiga observatörer, men deras tabellräkningar var väl också väl anpassade för att ge kort responstid?

[Kapten_Gars]

FWIW

German Artillery

At the end of World War I, the German military was forcibly dismantled by the Treaty of Versailles. Long-range and heavy artillery was destroyed and the largest artillery piece was limited to the 105mm Field Howitzer. Whereas the emphasis in the final years of WWI had been on centralized control of massed firepower, in the 1920's more weight was put on individual artillery batteries and the authority of the individual battery commander. After Hitler repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, heavy artillery reappeared in the inventory, and Bruchmüller's theories were reintroduced. However, the emphasis on battery control was never completely erased. Also, the Field Artillery was definitely a forgotten stepchild when it came to equipment, the Luftwaffe and Panzer forces being favored for modernization, especially in communications equipment. The result was that the Germans entered the war with a system at the divisional artillery regimental-level and below that was little more advanced than in World War I, with radios supplementing field telephones. It could be responsive and highly accurate at the battery level, but had little or no capability of massing fires, especially over short periods of time. German artillery also suffered from a general lack of equipment, which was offset somewhat by the use of heavy mortars and rocket launchers.

The German emphasis was on "destruction of point targets". With true Germanic precision, they would do the calculations intended to drop the initial rounds on top of the intended target. This requires accurate range estimation and incorporation of lots of correction factors for weather conditions, relative heights of the battery and target, barrel wear, etc. In his lecture, David Weseley says that when engaging targets of opportunity, they retained a relative inefficient method of computing range and direction that required them to know the relative range and bearing of the target, observer, and battery instead of the methods used by the British and U.S., who needed only the map positions of the target and battery. His point is that these calculations took time, and the average response time from call-for-fire to mission was on the order of 10-12 minutes. Whether this technique improved during the war is debatable, and unfortunately most sources tend to discuss German equipment rather than doctrine. On defence or for deliberate attack, the emphasis on precision was not problem, as the German observers and survey parties would do the calculations for lots of potential fires. A concentration could then be brought down by means of a code word and a map reference. The artillerymen of Grossdeutschland summed up their defensive technique as "many tubes, few rounds, suddenly, on a single point." and it often slowed up or stopped a Soviet breakthrough.

The Germans liked to fire by battalion, but the batteries could split up to support individual infantry battalions, providing a small volume of relatively responsive fire, especially when the infantry battalion had a separate mission. They would then reform when the battle was concluded. On defence, or in a deliberate attack, the Germans were well drilled on combining the fire of multiple batteries and even battalions. At higher levels of command, the Germans retained great administrative flexibility. They would parcel out artillery from the army reserve into task-oriented forces and reorganize artillery as needed and they still retained the ability to do Bruchmüller-style artillery fire plans. However, this flexibility will generally not be seen in a Battlefront game, because it was part of the preparation for the battle instead of the execution of the battle. They also made one attempt to reorganize their artillery based on a coherent divisional organization, but this was submerged in the Russian flood. Also, as German artillery remained numerically weak throughout the war, and gathering large artillery formations at one point would require stripping other areas of the front of some of their support.

Finally, much of the German artillery (and indeed much of their army), relied on horse-drawn transport. Reducing their pace to that of the horse and meant that they took longer to get into position. As Battlefront games generally begin with forces in place, this will not usually effect things.

German Artillery can be classified:
Command - Medium-High level. While they Germans often permanently assigned batteries and battalions to support specific units, they kept some of their artillery in reserve and parceled it out to the areas of the front where it was needed. While they were capable of using coordinated strikes in a prepared fireplan, they didn't do this well against targets of opportunity.
Control - Medium. Forward observers and officers made most of the calls-for-fire for the artillery. They were generally tied to controlling specific elements.
Communications - Average. Radios were not as prevalent as might be expected for a modern army. Ground-lines were used heavily. When they did use radios, they were used to connect the observer to the individual elements that were under his control. Unlike the British and Americans, the Germans did not fully develop the concept of a radio net that allows the rapid sharing of resources. In Battlefront, this means that the Germans do not have any special multiple-element missions.

British Artillery

As with all participants in World War I, the British had considerable experience with the calculations necessary to deliver effective indirect fire. In addition, they came up with a really simple system that used map grid references. Previous calculations had required that you know the position of the observer relative to the guns and the position of the target relative to the observer. Then you could use trigonometric functions to figure out where to point the guns. The map grid reference system required that you know the position of the target and the guns relative to a map and did not require the position of the observer. This decreased the time needed to deliver fire on a target to approximately 2-3 minutes from the call-for-fire to the arrival of the shells. The British sacrificed some accuracy for speed, and their larger patterns tend to be somewhat wider than those of their American cousins. This was acceptable because the aim of British artillery was often not to destroy the enemy with fire but to neutralize him to make the job of other units easier.

Although their tactics up to regimental level were established in the pre-war period and did not change much during the war, in 1941 Brig HJ Parham, the CRA (Commander Royal Artillery) of 38 Division, invented and tested new procedures for coordinating fire from higher echelon assets. These culminated in demonstrating a 144 gun concentration (approximately 6 regiments) against an opportunity target within 5 minutes of the target being called. In mid-1942 XIII Corps conducted further trials and new doctrine was issued late that year. These concentrations were known as Mike (regiment), Uncle (division), Victor (corps), William (army) and Yoke (AGRA=Army Group Royal Artillery) targets and always initiated by the radio call "Mike Target, Mike Target, Mike Target" (or Uncle, etc) that galvanized Command Posts and guns to action. This system allowed them to put vast amounts of firepower in the hands of a single Observer, combining fire from diverse missions into an overwhelming single strike (although usually in Battlefront you will not see the largest missions). This system gave them one of the two most effective artillery systems used in World War 2 (the other being that of the U.S.-partisans of both systems can conduct a theological argument about which was "best"-the Germans didn't appreciate being on the receiving end of either of them).

The British were also very skilled at preparatory barrages, and preplanned fire, and many scenarios can start with several turns of pre-planned barrages or concentrations.

British Artillery was never "in reserve", even if the combat formation it was supporting was not in contact with the enemy. It was available for use on targets within range. There were two basic command and control relationships:
'Under Command'; and
'In Support', which made firepower available, normally all guns within range, and enabled firing across divisional and higher formation boundaries. In this respect the British Artillery system was more flexible than the American, as American commanders occasionally felt proprietary towards the artillery formations assigned to them.
The consequence of these simple arrangements was highly flexible mobile firepower that could be provided where and when it was needed. 'Under Command' meant that control was centralized under the commander, while 'In Support' meant decentralization. Typically a regiment 'under command' of a division would be 'in support' to a particular brigade, but this did not prevent it firing in support of formations to its flanks.

British Artillery can be classified:
Command - High level. The British commanded their artillery from a high level. This allowed them to share assets and prepare massive strikes.
Control - Low-medium level. Battery Forward observers were able to order strikes from their own batteries and request strikes from almost any level in their hierarchy. Even though the ability to call for fire was limited to trained observers and officers, the British generally deployed many observers and they worked closely with the formations they were supporting.
Communications - Good. Forward observers utilized both radios and ground lines and this allowed them to rapidly place calls-for-fire

U.S Artillery
American artillery fire control and doctrine made it among the most flexible in the war.

One major difference between U.S. artillery and that of other nations is found in the Call-for-Fire table, which shows that U.S. troop units are capable of calling General Support artillery. In Closing with the Enemy, Michael C. Doubler says: "Artillery FOs with infantry battalions often became casualties or were not in a good location to call for fires. To solve these problems, infantry regiments in Sicily and Italy began to train all personnel, down to and including platoon sergeants, in FO procedures. At the same time, artillery units began to train all members of FO teams in call for fire techniques. By having more people qualified as FOs in the front lines, infantry regiments helped ensure the availability of constant, responsive fire support." In Battlefront, every U.S. troop unit a potential spotter. Most other nations followed the doctrine developed in World War I, where only the trained observers and officers were expected to control fire missions.

The Americans independently developed the "map reference" technique developed by the British, but went a step further by developing precomputed visual and mechanical aids that automated most of the calculations needed to conduct fire missions. This allowed them to bring down fire with the speed of the British (about 3 minutes from request to firing) and the precision of the Germans. One of the factors computed by these aids was the time-of-flight of the shells. By timing when the batteries fired, the U.S. fire direction centers were able to have the fire from all of the assets in a mission arrive at the same time in a single deadly strike known as a "Time-on-Target" mission. It should be noted that all nations were able to do these computations, but the American advantage was that they were pre-computed. This allowed the U.S. artillery to use the computations without having to actually do the computations, greatly speeding the task.

For a true (and extremely readable) account of American artillery in action, we would like to recommend Robert Weiss's excellent book "Enemy, North, South, East, West". He and another U.S. FO, their radios, and massive artillery support kept elements of two German S.S. Divisions from mounting an effective attack on a single surrounded U.S. infantry battalion for almost 5 days during the Mortain counterattack in early August 1944.

We also recommend David Weseley's lecture on artillery that can be purchased at Europa 2000 Tapes

U.S. Artillery can be classified:
Command - High level/Diffused. The U.S. was able to allocate artillery as needed, even from different organizations.
Control - Lowest level. Although Battalion Fire Direction Centers (FDC) made the actual decision on which missions to fire, and trained Forward Observers were the favored artillery spotters, the ability to request missions was given to most front-line troops. If the FO becomes a casualty, the ability to contact the artillery is not lost.
Communications - Excellent. Almost everyone had a radio and ground lines were also used when available. This allowed calls-for-fire not only to be easily placed, but also heard and possibly responded to by anyone on the "net

WWII French Artillery
French Theory
At the beginning of World War II, the French artillery system was based on the lessons they had learned in World War I. They refined the techniques learned in the "Great War" and their artillery tactics worked well when given the chance to function as intended. At the Battle of Gembloux, the French Artillery-Infantry defense stopped the German Blitzkrieg, allowing the French to hold their positions until they were outflanked to the South. The fact that the Germans were able to score a quick victory was not due to a deficiency in the artillery, although the battle of movement that occurred in 1940 often prevented the French artillery from being used to its maximum effectiveness.
The Fire Plan
Introduction
The mathematics and techniques of bringing indirect fire down on specific locations from separate battery positions had been worked out thoroughly in the 1914-1918 period and were used in some form by almost all nations at the beginning of WWII. Whenever the French moved to a new position, the first priority of the artillery was to establish a Fire Plan.

In other places in the tutorial, we use the term fire plan to refer to a pre-game set of barrages and fire missions that will land on specific turns in the game. When considering French Artillery, the meaning is different. It means the integration of artillery assets into an overall control structure. Of course in a Battlefront games, the French can have preplanned fire missions as well, but when discussing the French artillery practices, we are using the more general meaning.
Establishing a French Fire Plan requires that:
Forward Observer positions be established from where they could see the area to be attacked/defended by artillery
Battery Positions be established and their positions relative to the FOs be determined precisely.
Communications be established between the FOs and the firing assets.
Rather than having the FOs connected with specific single batteries, as was often the German practice, the French added a twist by establishing the poste central du groupe which was a small headquarters subordinate to the commander of the artillery battalion. The poste central du groupe calculated the data necessary for firing all three batteries of a battalion at the same target and Battery commanders simply followed the instructions given them. The advantage of this system is that it allowed an artillery battalion to mass the fires of its batteries quickly on a single target. The disadvantage is that it took battery commanders out of the loop. In many ways the poste central du groupe has a similar function to the late-war U.S. Fire Direction Center (FDC), the primary difference being that the French system was still tied closely to the Forward Observer, and the flexibility of the U.S. map system and calculation aids had yet to be invented. If they had been allowed the time, the French Artillery might have evolved into a much more flexible system. In game terms, the effect of the French organization is that off-board artillery should almost always fire by battalion.

The Moroccan division at the Battle of Gembloux had an artillery fire plan within 24 hours of occupying their positions in Belgium. This included registering some artillery battalions from an adjacent division that were allocated to support the Moroccans. This indicates that a scenario designer can assume that a basic fire plan has been developed if the French have been in their positions for a day or more. The longer that the French occupied a position, the more sophisticated the fire plan is likely to be. More batteries were registered, and communications were improved. A scenario can specify that some battalion assets are part of the plan and others are not (and are therefore less effective). An extreme example of a fire plan is found in the main Maginot Line positions, where virtually every angle and position had been pre-plotted over the months of construction. Despite our modern contempt for these fortifications, it should be noted that in 1940 they were considered "state-of-the-art" and the Germans never made a serious attempt to force them by frontal attack.
Equipment
Introduction

The basic artillery support of the Infantry Division was 3 Battalions of 75mm Guns (12 in each battalion), one battalion usually assigned to support each infantry regiment. These were often the 75mm Model 1897 gun (the famous "French 75"). While most countries were standardizing on 105mm howitzer as the basic weapon of the artillery the French were unable to do so for political and budgetary reasons:
They had a lot of 75mm guns left in their arsenal. It was hard to convince politicians to allocate money for new artillery, especially while the bulk of the defence budget was now being allocated to the Maginot line. Also much of the heavier artillery was procured during World War I and was of relatively recent design.
Many of the Generals who had advocated the virtues of the 75mm gun were in positions of high responsibility. They were unconvinced that new artillery was needed.
After all, they won WWI using this gun, it couldn't be all bad.

In addition to the 75mm guns the French had some battalions of 105mm and 155mm artillery available. Divisions usually had 1 or 2 battalions of 155mm howitzers. Corps artillery had 2 battalions of 105mm guns and 2 battalions of 155mm howitzers. Divisional and corps artillery are usually only in general support as part of an integrated fire plan.

On attack-The "Deliberate Advance"
Introduction
Their experiences in 1914-1918 had convinced the French High Command that mobile warfare was unlikely. Instead, they based their idea of an offensive on a plan called the "Deliberate Advance". This was designed to give a slow but extremely safe method of attacking, designed to maximize enemy casualties and minimize friendly casualties. Of course it also minimized the chance of rapidly winning the war. There was a common saying in vogue at the time that "The Artillery conquers, the Infantry occupies", and the Deliberate Advance certainly mirrored this theory. The basic idea of the DA was for friendly artillery to pulverize enemy front line positions and neutralize the enemy artillery, after which friendly troops would occupy their trenches. If this seems similar to what happened in World War I, it is not coincidental!

The deliberate advance was to be done in distinct stages:
Reconnaissance
Using infantry patrols, air reconnaissance, and sound-ranging equipment, the French would determine the German (the French had a pretty good idea of who they were going to be fighting ) front line and artillery positions.
Preparation
Divisional and corps artillery assets would be brought forward and carefully sighted. A comprehensive fire plan would be developed designed to attain artillery supremacy. Prewar planning specified the extensive use of chemical weapons, and it is one of the few small mercies of WWII that they were not employed.
Bombardment and Attack
The plan would be put into effect. After the artillery plan had smashed the enemy artillery and forward positions, the infantry, accompanied by tanks, would occupy the enemy positions. Tanks were never seen as a breakthrough weapon, but were designed to act as mobile artillery platforms to overcome local strongpoints that survived the initial artillery concentrations.
Consolidation
After advancing 6-10km (the limit of the artillery support), the friendly forces would stop (ignoring that annoying Charles De Gaulle fellow screaming for them to continue on to Berlin), dig in and establish new trench lines and artillery positions. A new fire plan would be developed for the next stage of the advance.
The deliberate advance cycle could be repeated about once every 7-10 days. Although an adequate fire plan to defend the positions could be developed within a day, the reconnaissance necessary to for the next deliberate attack would take longer. This would give an average advance of 1km/day which was quite respectable by WWI standards. The key to the Deliberate Advance was the word Deliberate.

During the "phony war", the French used this a couple of times but then stopped (Poland had disappeared and there was no hurry). The basic defensive mindset of the French in 1939-40 meant that the Deliberate Advance was never really put to the test. However, it relied on its power upon a certain amount of cooperation from its opponent. If the enemy front-line trenches were heavily occupied and batteries fired from fixed positions, the DA could cause severe casualties. However, the build-up needed for a DA would be fairly easy to detect, and by deception operations the Germans could ensure that the massive blow would fall mainly on empty ground. They could then counterattack when the French attempted to consolidate.
On Defense-Forts and Concrete
Introduction
The French could see World War II coming, but spent much of their defense budget on concrete instead of tanks and mobile forces. In hindsight, the Maginot line was a waste of money, especially as it was not extended along the entire Northern frontier (for both political and budgetary reasons). The Germans simply went around the end of the fortification line. However, at the time, the idea of an impregnable shield on the border supported by mobile forces to the rear seemed to be sound doctrine. By the standards of 1939, the Maginot line WAS formidable, and the Germans did not really attempt a break-through. One of the features of the Maginot line was that almost every inch of ground around it was plotted for artillery support. It would have been very difficult to take by direct assault. When defending static positions, the fire plan should be comprehensive and well-developed.
On Defence-Mobile situations
The key to defending in mobile situations is whether the French have been allowed time enough to register their artillery. As stated earlier, it took the French about 24 hours to establish a basic fire plan.
Communications
Along with most nations during World War II, the French relied on wire communications between their forward positions and their firing assets. These were generally reliable, but could sometimes be broken up by shelling/bombing the rear areas.

French Artillery can be classified:
Command - High level*. When they were given the time to establish a fire plan, the French were able to allocate artillery from Corps and Division into their fire missions. The poste central du groupe allowed them to control all fire of the battalion from a relatively high level. This was one of the main differences between their artillery system and that of the Germans, where FOs were often tied to specific batteries. The fire plan would improve while the French occupied the same positions with more assets being tied into the plan. If they were not given time to establish a fire plan, their artillery was considerably less effective.
Control - Medium. Dedicated Forward observers made most of the calls-for-fire for the artillery.
Communications - Average. As long as they were using their established positions, they could expect relatively good communications. They were not particularly flexible in the advance. If their FOs left their observation posts, their communications would become less reliable until they had the opportunity to string new wire.

Introduction to Russian Artillery

Russian Artillery can be classified:
Command - High level. The Russians tended to control their artillery centrally (as they did everything else). This did allow them to share assets and prepare massive strikes, but they were not flexible enough to use this at the tactical level.
Control - High level. The Russians planned their fire missions centrally as well. You will not see the larger artillery on the Battefront gaming table except as part of a pre-game fire plan. Only a few units are capable of calling-for-fire.
Communications - Poor. The Russians relied on ground lines extensively. When they are displaced from their prepared positions, their ability to call-for-fire is impaired.

[Andreas Lärka]

Jag undrar lite grand om Finlands artilleri, har förstått att de under andra världskriget låg långt framme inom artilleri och att de kunde konsten att "ställa in" artilleriet utan att skjuta in sig.

Jep,
Glöm de kommentarer du fått hittills... Citerar från Finlands artillerimuseums sida:

"Under den ryska tiden avvisades försök att grunda ett finskt artilleri. Många finländare som genomgått kadettskolan i Fredrikshamn tjänstgjorde i viktiga positioner i det kejserliga ryska artilleriet. Axel Gadolin, som sades vara ryss, var internationellt sett den mest berömd av dem.

Bland dessa officerare var också Vilho Petter Nenonen, en av de yngsta i gruppen. Han utvecklade finska artilleriet till det mest effektiva artilleriet i andra världskriget, även enligt utomstående utvärderingar. Artilleriets metoder tillägnades i andra länder först mycket senare.

Nenonen ville skapa enkla metoder med vilka det fåtaliga artilleriet som följde infanteriet skulle kunna ge koncentrerad eld i Finlands terräng som överraskande, exakta, korta och kraftiga eldstötar vid behov. Redan år 1925 blev artillerisektion med 12 pjäser artilleriets eldenhet hos oss, medan stormakterna använde artilleribatteriet med 4–6 pjäser som eldenhet ännu länge efter andra världskriget.

Faser i Nenonens utvecklingsarbete var förbättringen av kartläggning med hjälp av en kamera för flygkartläggning som Nenonen själv hade planerat år 1928, inledningen av väderleks- och mätningstjänst och ibruktagandet av artilleriradion år 1925. Eldledningssystem förenklades genom att man först introducerade eldledningskortet år 1920 och korrigeringstabellen år 1943. Korrigeringstabellen befriade eldledaren i främsta linjen från uträkningar och gav honom möjligheten att leda eld av eldenheter som hade tiotals pjäser utan att ens veta de eldgivande enheternas läge."

Det var alltså korrigeringstabellen som hjälpte Finland till avvärjningssegern på sommaren 1944. Speciellt vid Tali-Ihantala och dess mycket rörliga front var det artilleriet som gjorde största delen av grovjobbet. Med hjälp av korrigeringstabellen (en tabell med en rörlig genomskinlig gradskiva ovanpå) kunde en enda eldledare med hjälp av en kompass och med kännedom om fiendens position leda elden av X batterier. Han meddelade koordinaterna för fienden, och sedan ställde batterier in sina kanoner med hjälp av korrigeringstabellen. Sedan var det bara att skjuta på. Och ju mera kanoner som skjuter på samma mål, desto större är naturligtvis effekten.

[Hans]

Dettasom Larsson skrev kan kanske vara av intresse.

MVH

Hans

[MD650]

Jag undrar lite grand om Finlands artilleri, har förstått att de under andra världskriget låg långt framme inom artilleri och att de kunde konsten att "ställa in" artilleriet utan att skjuta in sig.

Jep,
Glöm de kommentarer du fått hittills... Citerar från Finlands artillerimuseums sida:

"Under den ryska tiden avvisades försök att grunda ett finskt artilleri. Många finländare som genomgått kadettskolan i Fredrikshamn tjänstgjorde i viktiga positioner i det kejserliga ryska artilleriet. Axel Gadolin, som sades vara ryss, var internationellt sett den mest berömd av dem.

Bland dessa officerare var också Vilho Petter Nenonen, en av de yngsta i gruppen. Han utvecklade finska artilleriet till det mest effektiva artilleriet i andra världskriget, även enligt utomstående utvärderingar. Artilleriets metoder tillägnades i andra länder först mycket senare.

Nenonen ville skapa enkla metoder med vilka det fåtaliga artilleriet som följde infanteriet skulle kunna ge koncentrerad eld i Finlands terräng som överraskande, exakta, korta och kraftiga eldstötar vid behov. Redan år 1925 blev artillerisektion med 12 pjäser artilleriets eldenhet hos oss, medan stormakterna använde artilleribatteriet med 4–6 pjäser som eldenhet ännu länge efter andra världskriget.

Faser i Nenonens utvecklingsarbete var förbättringen av kartläggning med hjälp av en kamera för flygkartläggning som Nenonen själv hade planerat år 1928, inledningen av väderleks- och mätningstjänst och ibruktagandet av artilleriradion år 1925. Eldledningssystem förenklades genom att man först introducerade eldledningskortet år 1920 och korrigeringstabellen år 1943. Korrigeringstabellen befriade eldledaren i främsta linjen från uträkningar och gav honom möjligheten att leda eld av eldenheter som hade tiotals pjäser utan att ens veta de eldgivande enheternas läge."

Det var alltså korrigeringstabellen som hjälpte Finland till avvärjningssegern på sommaren 1944. Speciellt vid Tali-Ihantala och dess mycket rörliga front var det artilleriet som gjorde största delen av grovjobbet. Med hjälp av korrigeringstabellen (en tabell med en rörlig genomskinlig gradskiva ovanpå) kunde en enda eldledare med hjälp av en kompass och med kännedom om fiendens position leda elden av X batterier. Han meddelade koordinaterna för fienden, och sedan ställde batterier in sina kanoner med hjälp av korrigeringstabellen. Sedan var det bara att skjuta på. Och ju mera kanoner som skjuter på samma mål, desto större är naturligtvis effekten.

Korrgeringstabellen tar väl hänsyn till de fel som påverkas av inner- och ytterballistiken och korrgerar de felen för att erhålla rättliggande eld i första skott?!

[Andreas Lärka]

Korrgeringstabellen tar väl hänsyn till de fel som påverkas av inner- och ytterballistiken . . .

Idén bakom korrigeringstabellen torde först och främst vara i eldledningen. Tanken om att en enda person kan leda X batteriers eld utan att veta var dessa batterier finns.

Jag tror inte att korrigeringstabellen innehåller olika "kurvor" och värden för olika temperaturer och barometerställningar.

Anyway. Jag har inte något emot din kommentar: Om jag har förstått rätt så bygger Nenonens metoder på att man tar hänsyn till såväl inner- som ytterballistik (d.v.s. t.ex. kruttemperatur, krutets utformning, eldrörslängd samt yttertemperatur, lufttryck m.m.) Nenonen förnyade hela det finska artilleriet och han tog säkert hänsyn till ovannämnda faktorer då han gjorde så, vilket förstås indirekt påverkade korrigeringstabellen.

[Ragnar Svedje]

Jag undrar lite grand om Finlands artilleri, har förstått att de under andra världskriget låg långt framme inom artilleri och att de kunde konsten att "ställa in" artilleriet utan att skjuta in sig.

Jep,
Glöm de kommentarer du fått hittills... Citerar från Finlands artillerimuseums sida:

Det var alltså korrigeringstabellen som hjälpte Finland till avvärjningssegern på sommaren 1944. Speciellt vid Tali-Ihantala och dess mycket rörliga front var det artilleriet som gjorde största delen av grovjobbet. Med hjälp av korrigeringstabellen (en tabell med en rörlig genomskinlig gradskiva ovanpå) kunde en enda eldledare med hjälp av en kompass och med kännedom om fiendens position leda elden av X batterier. Han meddelade koordinaterna för fienden, och sedan ställde batterier in sina kanoner med hjälp av korrigeringstabellen. Sedan var det bara att skjuta på. Och ju mera kanoner som skjuter på samma mål, desto större är naturligtvis effekten.

Tack Andreas, det var detta jag efterlyste!

Alltså en genomskinlig gradskiva med tillhörande tabell, ännu ett exempel på att enkla lösningar ofta är bättre än mer komplicerade.